This paper presents a novel approach to deniable encryption using secret sharing techniques, distinct from honey encryption. Unlike honey encryption, which relies on a preprocessing step to reshape plaintext distribution, our method avoids computational assumptions and data preprocessing. This ensures deniability against attackers capable of forced decryption or brute-force attacks. Leveraging the concept of plausible deniability, multiple decryption keys can reveal different plaintexts from a single ciphertext. The symmetric scheme we propose is lightweight, efficient, and does not rely on computational intractability. This paper introduces False Bottom Encryption, a symmetric encryption scheme that combines aspects of honey encryption and deniable encryption without relying on computational intractability. Unlike honey encryption, which reshapes plaintext distribution through preprocessing, our approach achieves deniability by allowing multiple decryption keys to reveal different plaintexts from a single ciphertext. We provide numeric examples and Jupyter notebook implementations to validate the method's effectiveness.